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ABSTRACT
The field of Game Theory provides a useful mechanism formodeling
many decision-making scenarios. In participating in these scenarios
individuals and groups adopt particular strategies, which generally
perform with varying levels of success. However, most results have
focussed on players that play the same game in an iterated fashion.
This paper describes a framework which can be used to observe
agents when they do not know in advance which game they are
going to play. That is, the same group of agents could first play
a few rounds of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and then a few
rounds of the Linear Public Goods Game, and then a few rounds
of Minority Game, or perhaps all games in a strictly alternating
fashion or a randomized instantiation of games. This framework
will allow for investigation of agents in more complex settings,
when there is uncertainty about the future, and limited resources
to store strategies.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Turocy and von Stengel define Game Theory as ”the formal study
of decision-making where several players must make choices that
potentially affect the interests of the other players” [33]. Game
Theory provides the ability to reduce real world problems - those
which are stylized in the form of a game - to mathematical models.
This has resulted in the establishment of a huge array of formally
recognized problems. Examples include the Minority Game [7],
the Iterated PrisonerâĂŹs Dilemma [4], Public Goods Game [14],
etc. However, most game theoretic approaches consider each game
in isolation and do not investigate mechanisms, strategies or be-
haviours across games. This is inadequate for computational so-
cial simulations, since in reality human beings are confronted by
many (possibly conflicting) games, and respond differently to each.
Cognitive limitations on memory, time, resources, etc. combined
with spatial influences result in actual behaviour that is not pre-
dicted/matched by rational agent simulations [32]. In parallel, the
field of AI has been developing algorithms and techniques that focus
on achieving human-level competence in several fields. Complex
games with large state spaces such as Checkers [28] and Go [30],
games with imperfect information such as Texas Hold’Em Poker [6]
have been successfully played by algorithms. There are even al-
gorithms that attempt to induce long-term cooperative behaviour
in partly-competitive settings [9, 13]. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there has been no attempt at finding a general bag
of strategies that work in both competitive and cooperative set-
tings, allow for the emergence of cooperation, altruism, and are
flexible enough to be applied to many games. Human beings, on
the other hand, have limited cognitive abilities and yet are able to
(seemingly) effortlessly switch from domain to domain, and suc-
cessfully compete as well as cooperate. We believe this is partly
due to the inadequacy of computational simulation tools available
for complex adaptive agents to play multiple games in heteroge-
neous environments. There are no tools, for example, that allow
machine learning agents to be in competition with evolutionary
agents across multiple heterogeneous games. This paper reports on
a game-playing framework calledArena, that attempts to ameliorate
the situation by providing an Agent-based reconfigurable environ-
ment for tournaments. A tournament, here, is defined to be multiple
games played in some order, with players encountering each other
across games. The primary goal of such a reconfigurable environ-
ment is that researchers can modify players, strategies, game rules,
environments independent of each other, thus enabling not only a
richer simulation but also a controlled increase in complexity.Arena
aims to enable co-evolution of players, allowing the emergence of
trust, reputation and coalitions as a natural consequence of known
player identity across games.
2 RELATEDWORK
Multi-Agent systems have been used for simulations of many
problem domains such as Smart-grids [21], vehicular ad-hoc net-
works [11], smart buildings [36], e-procurement [35], cloud com-
puting [23], healthcare [1], and transport [17]. However, many of
these domains are complex enough that getting the same agent
to adapt and perform in a cross-domain manner is very difficult.
Desirable properties such as evolutionarily stable equilibria, alloca-
tive fairness etc. are also difficult to be formulated across multiple
domains in an easily understandable manner. Game theory, on the
other hand, has been used to mathematically compute or discover
optimizing behaviour across a plethora of games, with a variety
of constraints. However, it has not been used evaluate ’realistic’
players that often encounter more than one game and suffer from re-
source constraints and bounded rationality. This paper attempts to
create an intersection of game theory and multi-agent systems such
that the advances in agent-modelling and simulation techniques
can be applied in a well-understood games. Current approaches can
roughly be divided into multi-agent simulations and game theory
simulations.
Multi-Agent Simulations: Multi-Agent simulation environments
are often general purpose environments, that focus on providing
ease of modelling of problem domain or agent behaviour or learn-
ing strategies. Most simulations tend to involve the creation of
a bespoke implementation that is tied closely to the domain it is
being evaluated against, with many implementations written in
languages such as Netlogo [34] or environments such as Jason [5],
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Jade [2], etc. In spite of the sophistication of the agent environ-
ments, there are rarely any principled frameworks to test the same
strategy/learning algorithm inmultiple scenarios, since modelling
multiple problem domainswith any fidelity remains onerous. Hence,
despite multiple reports of the importance and value of diversity
for robustness in multi-agent systems [15, 31], to the best of our
knowledge, there are no agent-based simulation platforms that al-
low for a systematic investigation of the same agent/strategy across
heterogeneous problem domains.
Game Theory Simulations: Game theory abstracts away from
the heterogeneity of problem domains and investigates stylized
phenomena where the variables of interest are: payoffs, player
moves and the presence of equilibria in conditions of repeated play.
Most game theory simulators, to the best of our knowledge, focus
on certain kinds of games. For instance, Gambit [18] is an attempt
to build a generalized game playing framework for non-cooperative
games where all players have access to a common set of strategies
and the payoff for various moves is known at design time.
3 GENERALIZING GAME PLAYING
Current work of game playing tends to focus on the investigation of
strategies for playing specific games, finding equilibria in repeated
play or proving other properties for a specific game. However,
games can vary across many dimensions, such as number of play-
ers (two-player, multi-player), moves (simultaneous, sequential),
payoff (zero-sum, non-zero-sum), duration (repeated, one-shot), etc.
In order to build a generalized game playing simulator, it is impor-
tant to first agree on what constitutes a game and more generally a
simulation. As was highlighted in the introduction, our system is
specifically designed to support simulations that consist of multiple
heterogeneous games played by agents using a diverse set of strate-
gies. For example, a simulation may consist of 100 rounds of the
Minority Game followed by 100 rounds of the Iterated Prisoners
Dilemma. Further, the participants in this game may be broken
down such that 30% are using a random strategy, 40% are using
a Tit-for-Tat strategy, and 30% are using a random strategy. Inter-
woven into this model, we also envisage provision being made for
periodic adaption/evolution steps whereby the participants are able
to adjust/change their current strategy based on diverse means
(ranging from random selection to a performance review or even
the use of some form of genetic programming model).
Specifically, we envisage games to vary on the following axes:
• Number of Players: Two-Player, Multi-Player
• Moves: Simultaneous, Sequential
• Payoff: Zero-Sum, Non-Zero-sum, Rankings, Range of val-
ues (bounded and unbounded)
• Identity: Known, Unknown, Irrelevant
• Communication Between Players: Possible, Not possible
• Topology: Spatial, Non-spatial
Further, we envisage tournaments to vary on the following axes:
(1) Communication Between Players: Possible, Not possible
(2) Game Order: Ordered (known to players), Ordered (un-
known to players), Random
Figure 1: Stages of a Game
(3) Strategies: Fixed-Bag-Fixed-Choice, Fixed-Bag-Random-
Choice, Evolutionary Adaptation, Machine-learning adapta-
tion
Note: These are not the only possible axes or options on the axes.
Rather, these are the options that we are currently implementing. To
represent these axes in a simulation, we have fixed on the following
model. A simulation is a tournament that is played between a set
of agent players who employ a fixed range of strategies (this can
include meta-strategies that combine multiple sub-strategies). Each
tournament consists of a number of games to be played, each of
which consists of one ormore rounds. Each round of a game involves
an agent using their strategy to make a move. Each move is a bid /
choice made by the agent that is relevant to the game being played.
From here on, we refer to agents and players synonymously unless
specifically required for reasons of clarity.
3.1 Decomposing Games
Based on our abstract model of a simulation, we propose, in figure
1, a generalized workflow for the execution of a tournament:
• Start Tournament: The tournament specification (what
games, how many rounds, what agents, and what strategies)
is loaded and the simulator initialized.
• Create Game: A game is created based on the corresponding
specification and agents are linked to it.
• Start Round: Triggers the start of a round. This may involve
transmission of a state to each agent or simply a request to
make a move.
• Make Move: Here the agent must decide on its move which
is based on the associated strategy. The agents move is sub-
mitted to the game.
• Generate Outcome: The game, once all required moves are
made or a timer expires, decides on the outcome of the round
(who wins and who loses, what is the payoff) and communi-
cates this to the agents.
• Update Strategy: Here, the agent has the opportunity to up-
date its strategy based on the outcome.
• Collect Statistics: When there are no more rounds in a game,
the simulator gathers all specified statistics into a single
resource that is stored for later analysis.
• Adapt Strategy: If there are more games to be played, then
there is a chance for the agents to adapt their strategies. This
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may make use of some of the statistics gathered in the previ-
ous step. Adaptation can take any form that is appropriate,
from parameter tuning to the use of evolutionary techniques,
to machine learning techniques.
• End Tournament: The tournament finishes, statistics are col-
lated into a data set that is released as a set of files and any
requested summary statistics are presented to the user.
Of the above list of game stages, we believe that some are the
responsibility of the simulator, some the game, and some by the
strategy employed by the agent playing the game. For example, we
feel that the stages in figure 1 that are shaded are the responsibility
of the agent / strategy. While the others are the responsibility of
the game / simulator. The delineation allows us to cleanly separate
game design from strategy designwhich in turn allows us to develop
generalized strategies that can be used to play a diverse range of
games.
3.2 Generalized Game Design
To facilitate the integration of heterogeneous game types, we have
attempted to create an abstract model of a game that can be cus-
tomized as necessary.
Figure 2: Interaction of Players with Cartago Artifacts
Underpinning the model is the view of the player as an agent
that interacts with artifacts within the game environment. These ar-
tifacts serve as enablers / constrainers of agent moves. Through the
artifacts, each game specifies whether agents can recognize each
other, whether there is an ordering to moves, how many rounds
exist in a game, whether each round has an entry and exit con-
dition, whether payoff / penalty is dealt to the agents after every
round or it accumulates through the game. Thus, each game is
envisioned as a configuration of artifacts. This allows new games
to be created without having to re-write many common aspects
MG IPD
Number of players 3 or more (always odd) 2
Moves Simultaneous Simultaneous
Amount of Payoff Fixed Fixed
Identity Irrelevant Known
Comm b/w players Possible Not Possible
Topology Non-spatial Non-spatial
Table 1: Comparing Minority Game and IPD
of game playing. Figure 2 shows a sample code that is used to im-
plement both, Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma as well as the Minority
Game. This reconfiguration focused approach is extended deeper
into agent-strategies as well, as shall be seen in the next sub-section.
The artifact-based reconfiguration allows for another feature, evo-
lutionary spread of features across agents. This means that agents
that perform well can have their strategies copied and modified by
other agents (via mechanisms such as clonal plasticity [24]), thus
leading to evolutionary pressure on strategies.
3.3 Generalized Strategy Design
In order that strategies can be re-used across games, as well as new
strategies added to a game, all strategies conform to an interface
that agents can use to generate moves.
Figure 3: Snippet of Strategy Interface
The generateChoice and updateStrategy methods are self-
explanatory. The strategyResources map passed to generateChoice
contains external data which may be required by the agent in
decision-making. The parameters passed to updateStrategy are
simply to be stored within the strategy object’s internal resources
map as a key-value pair. The remaining methods are required by
the GUI for ensuring it reacts dynamically to user selection of
strategies.
3.4 Worked out Example
The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) and the Minority Game (MG)
are now compared to provide a concrete view of the generalization
via artifacts. IPD and MG share three artifacts (see Table 1), while
differing on three. Their implementation, therefore, is a simple
composition of parametrized artifacts, which leads to faster and
repeatable game creation.
Strategy Generalization: Generalizing strategies such that they
can be re-used across games is a littlemore involved. Quite often, the
strategy is very closely tied to the rules of the game or the number of
available options to the agents. BestPlay [7] is a strategy created by
the creators of the Minority Game. Recall that the MinorityGame
(MG) consists of a population of N (odd) individuals, who have
to make a simultaneous binary choice. The group that is in the
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Figure 4: BestPlay example for m=3
minority, after making a choice, is the winner that receives a payoff.
Although simple in its setup and play, the dynamics in MG has been
used in multiple fields such as econophysics [3, 37], multi-agent
resource allocation [16, 20], emergence of cooperation [10], and
heterogeneity [12, 19]. The BestPlay strategy utilizes two pieces
of information:(a)Memory of the winning moves from previous m
rounds; (b) Vector containing a pool of strategies. The vector, for
each player, is of length 2m and is used to decide what to play next.
Since MG allows only two moves, 1,−1, the previous m winning
moves can be encoded as a binary number (see Figure 4) The binary
number can then be converted to an integer corresponding to a
position in the strategy vector. In Figure 4, the strategy vector yields
−1, as 010 corresponds to the integer 2, giving the result in the third
position of the vector. Due to the nature of the encoding strategies,
BestPlay is only applicable to games that involve selecting one out
of two choices in every move. Since our intention is to allow the
same strategy to be used across as many games as possible, we
created a generalized implementation of BestPlay that retains its
fundamental structure, but is not limited by two choices.
Generalizing BestPlay: The strategy vector can be generalized
using a simple theorem that demonstrates how an n-ary code may
be converted into an integer [22]. Given a,b ∈ N with b > 1, there
exist non-negative integers x0,x1...xn such that
a = x0 + x1b + x2b
2 + . . . + xnb
n
with 0 ≤ xi < b and xn , 0
Consider a game which presents three options (O1,O2,O3) to
a player. The strategy vector would now be qm as opposed to 2m ,
whereq corresponds to the options available to a player. Continuing
with the previous example ofm = 3, the strategy vector now has
a length of 33 = 27. The choices (O1,O2,O3) will be represented
as options 0, 1, 2. If the previousm winning moves wereO3,O3,O3,
Figure 5: BestPlay example for m=3 and q=3
which corresponds to code 222, then BestPlay would index into the
26th position of the strategy vector (see Figure 5).
This results in an implementation of the BestPlay strategy, as
shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, playable in games with arbitrary
number of choices.
Figure 6: Constructor for BestPlay Strategy
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Figure 8: AOP-based Deployment
Figure 7: Generating a move using BestPlay Strategy
4 AN AOP-BASED GAME SIMULATOR
The goal of this work is to develop a flexible generalized game
simulator through which we can study various properties of games
and associated strategies. Specifically, we want to enable the de-
velopment of a simulator that can support a heterogeneous set of
games being played using a diverse suite of generalized strategies.
We also wish to explore how these generalized strategies perform
when applied to multiple game types that are played sequentially.
Typically, such simulators are implemented using languages
such as NetLogo or using some form of generalized programming
language (e.g. Java, C). In contrast, our approach is to explore the
use of Agent-Oriented Programming (AOP) languages [29] and re-
lated technologies. Specifically we will use the ASTRA language [8],
which is a variation of AgentSpeak(L) [26] together with CArtAgO
[27] a framework that supports the modeling of the agents envi-
ronment in terms of shared objects known as artifacts. This allows
for modelling phenomena such as cultural learning where agents
can copy strategies from successful neighbours.
A high level view of the proposed framework is highlighted in
figure 8. In this figure, the stick people are agents, and the triangles
are (CArtAgO) artifacts. In line with section 2, the game artifact
specifies a generalized interface through which agents can interact
with a game (e.g. make move) and the strategy artifacts are gen-
eralized artifacts that can be used to instantiate and use specific
game strategies (e.g. random play, best play, ...). The register artifact
provides a centralized list of players and their availability. When
started, the Tournament Master reads the tournament specification
and creates an initial community of Player agents (who create asso-
ciated strategy artifacts). These players are added to the registry.
The Tournament Master then creates a Game Master who sets up a
Game artifact that the Player agents connect to. The Game Master
is responsible for the execution of the game. Its first task is to select
a set of players to play the game. This is dependent on the selection
policy adopted, and can be either a random selection of players of
specific types or a fixed set of players. These players are invited to
join the game, the game is played, and at the end, the Game Master
informs the players that the game is over (causing the players to
disconnect from the associated game artifact).
Our initial plan is to generate generic implementations of the
Tournament Master, Game Master, and Player agents. These imple-
mentations will allow enough configuration to support their use
with any game / basic game strategy. However, the motivation for
using an AOP language to implement this is that, in the future (see
our roadmap 5) we intend to start changing the Player agent to sup-
port more complex game playing behaviours. Due to the clear sepa-
ration of concerns enforced through the use of an AOP language, we
believe that this will be easier to achieve than if we had used a stan-
dard general purpose programming language. The current imple-
mentation can be accessed at: https://gitlab.com/aop-arena
5 ROADMAP
This paper describes a prototype, and is therefore only able to de-
scribe features that we have already implemented. However, we
have a roadmap of features that we are working on implementing.
Currently, all implementation is in the form of ASTRA agents and
CArtAgO artifacts. However, this requires re-compilation of code
whenever any aspect of the experiment changes. For easier exper-
iment design and setup, we expect that more aspects need to be
made into pure configuration text, so that non-coding-specialists
can also use Arena. The features we expect to add to Arena are:
(1) Open System with agents that enter and exit a tour-
nament: Complex domains such as urban modelling often
require that simulations be ‘open’, i.e., agents must be able
to enter, exit and re-enter a simulation.
(2) Game Description Language: A human-readable and
machine-parseable language for describing game rules, in
terms of setup, number of players, sequential or simulta-
neous, competitive or cooperative or coalitional, kinds of
payoffs, number of rounds, time-bound or not etc.
(3) Player Description Language: Players can diverge on the
kinds of strategies that they implement, i.e., they may be
adaptive agents that adapt their strategies or machine learn-
ing agents that have one strategy that continuously adapts
itself, or agents that possess a bag-of-strategies which they
play in some order.
(4) Tournament Description Language: A human-readable
and machine-parseable language for describing the order of
games, number of repetitions for each game, open or closed
system (can new agents enter in themiddle of a tournament?)
(5) Detection of Emergence within Tournament: The pres-
ence of features such as known identity of players, multiple
heterogeneous games, sophisticated strategies such as evo-
lution / machine learning could lead to the emergence of
‘agreements’, unofficial rules, etc. which would be valuable
to detect. We aim to incorporate tournament-wide emer-
gence detection [25] mechanisms to allow for automated
monitoring of large-scale tournaments.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper reports on a first prototype of a generalized game playing
framework called Arena, that allows for the same agents to play
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multiple heterogeneous games. Arena currently allows strategies,
game rules, and players to evolve independently of each other.
As of this writing, we have implemented the Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Minority Game, Linear Public Goods Game, with agents
that can play multiple rounds of each game, based on a tournament
configuration. Strategies such as Tit-for-Tat, BestPlay have also
been implemented in a generalized manner such that they can be
re-used across games, by merely querying game parameters. We
expect a more mature version of the framework to be a valuable tool,
both for the agents community as well as game theory researchers.
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